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While the current proportion of old-age population of Korea is lower
than other OECD countries, the speed of population aging is very high.
Even though the proportion of the population aged 65 and older was 
7.2 percent as of 2000, much lower than the developed countries, the pro-
portion is projected to increase to 23.1 percent in 2030, almost the same 
as their projected average (see table 10.1). More old-age dependents rela-
tive to workers resulting from population aging suggests the likelihood of
more consumption relative to income and, therefore, less national saving.
Increase in the old-age dependency ratio substantially aﬀects the ﬁscal
policies. The government expenditures such as public pension beneﬁts and
medical insurance beneﬁts will increase rapidly as the population is aging.
Public assistance programs for the low-income classes are also expected to
increase since the poverty rate for the old-age population is higher than
that for working age groups in Korea. On the other hand, the decrease in
working population will restrict the tax base of the future. As a result, the
population aging will increase the ﬁscal burden of future generations and,
therefore, decrease resources available for them, which suggests less saving
in the future.
The long-term budgetary imbalance in Korea will also contribute to the
future savings reduction through the increase in ﬁscal burden of future
generations. Even though the consolidated budget balance at present
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for their valuable comments and suggestions.maintains surplus, the budget balance will turn deﬁcit in the near future
and the magnitude of the deﬁcit will rapidly rise in the future if Korean
government maintains the current ﬁscal policies. In particular, long-term
budgetary imbalance of public pensions due to too generous promised
level of pension beneﬁts compared with pension contributions, and pro-
spective increase in Medical Insurance beneﬁts, and the resistance to in-
crease in social insurance contributions, will deteriorate the long-term
budgetary imbalance. Therefore, the current ﬁscal stance of Korean gov-
ernment will shift the ﬁscal burden to the future generations, which will
lower the national savings rate in the future.
The purpose of this chapter is to evaluate the eﬀects of population aging
and ﬁscal policies on national savings in the Korean situation. For the pre-
diction of the national savings rate of Korea for the next several decades,
we employ a life-cycle model, which incorporates the generational ac-
counting approach needed to assess the distribution of ﬁscal burden across
generations. Even though our main focus is on the eﬀects of population
aging and ﬁscal stance, we also study the eﬀects of change in asset compo-
sition, such as annuitization of asset resulting from maturing of public pen-
sions and introduction of reverse annuity mortgages through the estima-
tion of consumption functions, which enables comparison of elasticity of
consumption with respect to various kinds of wealth. We found that the
rapid population aging and long-term budgetary imbalance will substan-
tially lower the national savings rate in Korea. A sensitivity analysis based
on an alternative model, an altruistic family model, shows that the predic-
tion is robust to the speciﬁcation of altruism among generations. In addi-
tion, the estimation results of consumption functions with respect to vari-
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Table 10.1 Demographic structure and dependency ratios of selected countries (%)
Total  Demographic structure
dependency
2000 2030 ratio
Country 0–14 15–64 65+ 0–14 15–64 65+ 2000 2030
World 29.7 63.4 6.9 22.4 65.8 11.8 57.7 52.0
Developed countries 18.2 67.4 14.4 15.4 62.0 22.6 48.4 61.3
Developing countries 32.5 62.4 5.1 23.6 66.5 9.9 60.3 50.4
Japan 14.7 68.1 17.2 12.7 59.3 28.0 46.8 68.6
United States 21.5 66.0 12.5 17.8 61.6 20.6 51.5 62.3
Italy 14.3 67.5 18.2 11.6 59.3 29.1 48.1 68.6
France 18.7 65.4 15.9 16.9 59.9 23.2 52.9 66.9
China 24.9 68.3 6.8 17.3 67.0 15.7 46.4 49.3
India 33.3 61.7 5.0 22.3 68.0 9.7 62.1 47.1
Korea 21.1 71.7 7.2 12.4 64.6 23.1 39.5 54.9
Source: United Nations, World Population Projections, 1998.ous kinds of wealth suggest that the annuitization of wealth due to matur-
ing of public pensions and introduction of reverse annuity mortgages is
likely to further decrease the savings rate in the future.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 10.2
brieﬂy describes the demographic transition in Korea for the next several
decades, based on our population projection. Section 10.3 explains our ba-
sic framework for the prediction of savings rate of the future, a life-cycle
model in which the agents’ consumption and savings is determined by the
propensity to consume and the magnitude of resources available for the re-
maining lifetime, including human wealth, current asset holdings, and the
value of net transfer income from the government. Section 10.4 explains
the data source used to estimate the propensity to consume, which is used
in the projection of consumption and savings, the method of imputation 
of human wealth, and net transfer income from government. Section 10.5
presents our ﬁndings, and Section 10.6 summarizes and concludes the
chapter.
10.2 Demographic Transition in Korea
Figures 10.1 through 10.3 summarize the population projection based
on the 2001 population projection model of the National Statistics Oﬃce
(NSO) of Korea. The 2001 NSO projection covers the period of 2001 to
2050. We extend the population projection up to 2110 by using the NSO’s
assumptions about fertility rates,1 mortality rates,2 and international mo-
bility rates.3 Baseline calculations are conducted under the assumption
that the total fertility rate and age-sex mortality rates will remain constant
at their 2050 levels until 2110.
The ﬁgures indicate that Korea will experience drastic change in demo-
graphic structure as well as total population. The total population is pro-
jected to reach its maximum level around 2025 and decrease rapidly there-
after. The proportion of those aged 65 and older will increase from 9
percent (as of 2005) up to 38 percent and that of the economically active
population, aged 15 to 64, will decrease from 71 percent to 53 percent,
which implies that while the current proportion of old-age population is
smaller than other OECD countries (see table 10.2), the speed of popula-
tion aging is very high, because of a low fertility rate and prolonged life ex-
pectancy. In particular, the fertility rate of Korea is much lower than many
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1. We made three alternative fertility rate assumptions: high, medium, and low fertility rate
assumption. Our base case result is based on the medium fertility assumption (see table 10.3).
2. The average life expectancy is projected to rise from 76 years currently to 83 years in
2050.
3. International movement of population is limited in Korea. For example, net immigration
in 2000 was 11,000 (emigration 43,000 immigration 54,000). We assume that the international
movement rates remain constant at their 2050 levels until 2110.other OECD countries.4Moreover, the NSO projects that the total fertility
rate will decrease from 1.47 in 2000 to 1.40 in 2040, which will accelerate
the process of population aging (see table 10.3).5
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Fig. 10.1 Total population (1 million persons)
Fig. 10.2 Proportion by age group (base case)
4. The fertility rate of Korea as of 2000 was 1.47. The rates for other OECD countries are
1.36 (Germany), 1.88 (France), 1.41 (Japan), 2.06 (United States), 1.64 (United Kingdom).
5. The fertility rate has fallen up to 1.13 (as of 2003), lower than its assumed level in 2030
under the base case assumption. However, we do not reﬂect this drastic change in fertility of
recent years in the fertility assumption, since the change might be a temporary one resulting
from economic crisis since 1997 triggered by foreign currency deﬁciency, which is followed by
economic recession.Fig. 10.3 Proportion of the aged 65 and older under alternative fertility 
rate assumptions
Table 10.2 Speed of population aging of selected countries
Number of years
Year attained required for transition
Proportion of old-age
population (%)a 71 4 2 0 7 →14 14→20
Japan 1970 1994 2006 24 12
France 1864 1979 2020 115 41
Germany 1932 1972 2012 40 40
United Kingdom 1929 1976 2021 47 45
Italy 1927 1988 2007 61 19
United States 1942 2013 2028 71 15
Korea 2000 2019 2026 19 7
Source: United Nations, The Sex and Age distribution of World Population, each year.
aProportion of the population aged 65 and older.
Table 10.3 Fertility assumptions (total fertility rate)
Medium fertility
Year Low fertility (base case) High fertility
2000 1.47 1.47 1.47
2005 1.35 1.38 1.43
2010 1.32 1.37 1.45
2015 1.31 1.37 1.50
2020 1.27 1.37 1.54
2025 1.21 1.38 1.61
2030 1.15 1.39 1.69
2040 1.10 1.40 1.80A United Nations (1998) projection also shows that the proportion of the
population aged 65 and older will increase from 7.2 percent (as of 2000),
much lower than the average of developed countries (14.4 percent), to 23.1
percent (2030), almost the same as their projected average (22.6 percent).
The time required for the old-age population proportion to increase from 7
percent (14 percent) to 14 percent (20 percent) is 19 years (7 years), which
is much shorter than in other developed countries: France (115 years 
[41 years]), United States (71 years [15 years]), and Japan (24 years [12
years]). Thus, Korea will age much faster than any other OECD countries.
10.3 Basic Framework
We adopt a life-cycle framework for the prediction of savings rates of the
next several decades. The economy is populated with a large number of in-
dividuals who belong to diﬀerent cohorts indexed by the year of their birth.
The individuals do not face mortality risks and live for Dyears. We assume
that each agent in the economy makes decisions on consumption ﬂow and
the magnitude of bequest to maximize the lifetime expected utility. The ob-
jective function and the budget constraint of the agent aged a at year t are
as follows:
(1) Ua,t  ∑
D
i a
 i au(Ci,t i a, i)    D 1 av(bD 1,t D 1 a)
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where C, b, u( ), v( ) represent consumption and magnitude of bequest, di-
ﬀerentiable strictly concave utility functions of consumption6and bequest,
respectively. And,  , A, W, B, and T are discount rate, current asset hold-
ings, noncapital income, transfer payment from the government, and tax
payment to the government.
The lifetime budget constraint implies that the present value of con-
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6. We deﬁne the utility as function of age as well as consumption amount to reﬂect the
diﬀerence in preference across ages.sumption and bequest is not more than the total wealth available for the
remaining lifetime, which is composed of asset holdings at present (Aa,t);
human wealth (HW a,t), which is the present value of noncapital income
earned for the remaining lifetime; and the net government transfer wealth
(NBa,t), which is deﬁned as the present value of transfer income from the
government minus tax payment.
The optimization of the agent aged aat period tyields the following path
of consumption and bequest.
(3)   f 1[ (1   rt i 1 a); i]    i,t i a,
f  ; i    , i   a, . . . , D   1.
(4)  g 1[ (1 rt D 1 a); D]   D,t D a, g  ; D  
where f and g are the marginal rate of substitution functions for the homo-
thetic utility.
Using equations (3) and (4) together with the lifetime budget constraint,
we solve for the consumption of the aged a.
(5) Ca,t   ∑
D 1
i a  
i
s a
 i,t i a  
 1(Aa,t   HW a,t   NBa,t) 
  PCa,t(Aa,t   HW a,t   NBa,t)
Equation (5) shows that an individual’s consumption at the age of ais the
product of total assets available for the remaining lifetime and this age’s av-
erage propensity to consumption out of the total asset (PCa,t). Equation (5)
is our basic framework to project the consumption rate for the next several
decades.
We follow several steps for the projection. We ﬁrst estimate the average
propensity to consume, by age and sex, out of total assets using a micro-
data set. Then, we project the magnitude of total assets by age and sex, in-
cluding current asset holdings, human wealth, and the net government
transfer wealth, for the next several decades. Finally, we compute the con-
sumption amount by age and sex for each year and savings rate.
The national savings are composed of the private savings and the gov-
ernment savings. The private savings are the diﬀerence of the total income,
the sum of wage income, capital income and net transfer from government,








bD 1,t D 1 a   
CD,t D a






Ci 1,t i 1 a   
Ci,t i a
Population Aging, Fiscal Policies, and National Saving 345(6) Sa,t   W a,t   rtAa,t   Ba,t   T a,t   Ca,t
(7) Aa 1,t 1   Aa,t   Sa,t
The government saving is deﬁned as the (primary) budget surplus of the
government: in other words, tax revenue – transfer payment – government
consumption (GCt; see equation [8]), and the national income (Yt) is the
sum of labor income and capital income (see equation [9]).
(8) GSt  ∑
D
a 0
(T a,t   Ba,t) a,t   GCt
(9) Y t  ∑
D
a 0
(W a,t   rtAa,t) a,t
where  a,t is the population of the aged a at period t.
10.4 Data and Imputations
To predict future savings rates, we need to estimate the average propen-
sity to consume, and predict the magnitude of human wealth, and the net
government transfer wealth by age for the future, in addition to each year’s
Gross National Product (GNP) and government consumption, which we
discuss in section 10.3. In this section we discuss the procedures of esti-
mating the average propensity to consume, and projection of the magni-
tude of human wealth, and the net government transfer wealth for the fu-
ture period.
10.4.1 Estimating the Average Propensity to Consume
We use the Korea Labor and Income Panel Study (KLIPS)7 to estimate
the average propensity to consume. KLIPS consists of a household survey
and an individual survey. The household survey contains information
about the income, consumption, and asset holdings, including real estate
and ﬁnancial assets, of households. The individual survey contains infor-
mation about the current employment status, current level of wage and in-
come of the self-employed, job experience of the past, public pension par-
ticipation status, and current pension beneﬁts amount (see table 10.4).
As mentioned in section 10.3, total asset consists of current asset hold-
ings, human wealth, and net government transfer wealth. We assume that
total asset holdings of each household are equally distributed between the
household head and his/her spouse.
We compute individuals’ human wealth, the present value of noncapital
income for the remaining lifetime, ΣD
i a{Πs t
t i–a[1/(1   rs)]}W i,t i–a, using the
346 Young Jun Chun
7. The KLIPS started to survey from 1998 and its most recent survey is 2004. We use the
1999 to 2002 surveys for the estimation of the average propensity to consume.age-sex proﬁle of average income and employment rate.8 We assume that
the average wage growth rate and the discount rate are 1.5 percent and 3.5
percent9 per annum in real term.
To compute the government transfer wealth, we ﬁrst compute the net
public pension wealth from the KLIPS sample. For the retired people, we
use the reported public pension beneﬁt amount. For the people currently
working, we use the pension beneﬁt formula and contribution rules of
public pensions. In that process, we explicitly take into account the value
of each individual’s already acquired pension beneﬁt wealth, which is re-
ﬂected in his or her job experience of the past, as well as the expected value
of net pension wealth, which will be acquired by the contributions in the
future. The value of the latter is dependent upon the expectations about the
future employment status and government policy change. We assume that
each individual’s employment status of the future follows the same path of
the employment rate by age and sex. We assume that the individuals in the
sample maintain myopic expectations about the future government ﬁscal
policies, since we do not have any consensus about the public pension re-
form. As for the other components of the government transfer wealth, re-
lated with social insurance, means-test public aid programs, and taxes, the
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Table 10.4 Characteristics of KLIPS sample (2002 KLIPS sample)
Population  Average annual income
distribution Employment rate (1,000 won)
Age Male Female Male Female Male Female
15–19 380 358 0.047 0.078 6,687 7,423
20–24 293 415 0.314 0.482 10,143 12,076
25–29 418 403 0.687 0.526 15,963 13,536
30–34 454 376 0.874 0.436 20,942 14,737
35–39 419 379 0.902 0.475 24,807 13,075
40–44 445 381 0.892 0.528 24,491 13,876
45–49 374 332 0.874 0.482 25,756 11,843
50–54 299 266 0.866 0.474 26,436 11,927
55–59 219 208 0.772 0.288 19,336 8,354
60–64 142 227 0.754 0.233 13,203 7,617
65–69 100 178 0.640 0.135 13,013 6,940
70–74 53 130 0.472 0.100 8,981 2,714
75–79 24 105 0.250 0.019 4,260 4,800
80–84 12 50 0.333 0.200 12,060 2,400
85–90 5 26 0.000 0.000 0 0
90+ 0 8 0.000 0.000 0 0
8. Table 10.4 shows the population distribution, employment rate, and the average income
by age and sex in ﬁfth year (2002) sample of KLIPS as an example.
9. This value is based on the real interest rate of government bonds in recent years.KLIPS does not contain enough information to impute their value. There-
fore, we take an alternative approach, which uses the generational accounts
(GA) separated across the components of ﬁscal policies. We compute the
ratio of the negative value of the whole generational accounts (i.e., the
value of the net government transfer wealth10) to that of public pensions,
reported in table 10.10, and multiply this ratio with net public pension
wealth computed using the KLIPS sample to get the value of the net gov-
ernment transfer wealth. Table 10.5reports the value of net public pension
wealth and the net government transfer wealth by age and sex. The value
of the net public pension wealth shows an irregular age proﬁle, since Ko-
rean public pension consists of two diﬀerent plans: occupational pensions
(OCP), which covers government employees, private school employees,
and military personnel; and national pension (NPS), which covers the rest
of Korean residents. Since the NPS, which covers most of Korean resi-
dents, was introduced in 1998, most of NPS participants have not acquired
entitlement of pension beneﬁts. The OCP was ﬁrst introduced in 1960 to
cover the government employees and military personnel, and expanded the
coverage to private school employees in 1975. Since the OCPs are relatively
mature plans, they have produced many pension beneﬁt recipients. How-
ever, the net pension wealth reported in table 10.5 shows that pension
wealth of the aged 75 and older is 0, since the KLIPS sample does not cover
many occupational pension recipients. The imputed value of the net gov-
ernment transfer wealth shows negative for most of the cohorts, because
the value does not reﬂect the value of government consumption. It is also
because the transfer payment from government is not large at present due
to immature public pension systems and small magnitude of expenditure
of public aid programs.11
To impute the individual’s consumption, we need assumption on the dis-
tribution of consumption within family. We use Besanger, Guest, and Mc-
Donald’s (2000) estimate of age-proﬁle of consumption within families in
Australia.12 The average propensity to consumption is deﬁned as ratio of
consumption level to total wealth (for the composition of wealth in the
sample, see table 10.7). We compute the average propensity to consume,
using 1999 to 2002 KLIPS samples, and use the average level for the period
in the projection of the savings rate for the several decades (see tables 10.8
and 10.9).
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10. Section 10.4.3 explains the procedure of GA calculations and the GA values for the
components of ﬁscal policies. The GA is deﬁned as the present value of the net tax payment
to government (taxes minus transfer income), of the representative agent of each generation
for the remaining lifetime. Therefore, the net government transfer wealth deﬁned in section
10.3 is equivalent to the negative value of the GA.
11. Table 10.10 shows that the generational accounts for most of the cohorts are positive,
which implies that most taxpayers pay more taxes than they receive from the government.
12. Besanger, Guest, and McDonald (2000) also estimated the distribution of consumption
among family members for the case of the United States.Table 10.5 Net government transfer wealth
Ratio of net
Net public pension government transfer Net government transfer
wealth (1,000 won) to net pension wealth wealth (1,000 won)
Age Male Female Male Female Male Female
15–19 12,278 8,903 –5.90 –4.80 –72,443 –42,736
20–24 13,594 10,249 –6.18 –4.08 –84,009 –41,816
25–29 18,699 12,639 –5.49 –3.02 –102,658 –38,169
30–34 27,886 15,228 –2.77 –1.89 –77,243 –28,781
35–39 38,279 19,555 –1.32 –1.17 –50,528 –22,880
40–44 44,533 20,217 –1.32 –1.25 –58,783 –25,271
45–49 49,602 17,115 –1.28 –1.03 –63,491 –17,629
50–54 53,641 13,360 –0.81 –0.29 –43,449 –3,874
55–59 28,077 3,752 –0.37 –0.19 –10,388 –713
60–64 6,514 2,262 –1.15 –1.49 –7,491 –3,370
65–69 10,088 1,671 –1.37 –2.17 –13,820 –3,626
70–74 2,090 934 –2.47 –5.89 –5,161 –5,499
75–79 0 348 –2.70 –6.90 0 –2,403
80–84 0 0 –1.39 –4.18 0 0
85–89 0 0 0.46 1.19 0 0
90–94 0 0 2.80 13.94 0 0
95+ 0 0 5.80 27.18 0 0
Table 10.6 Composition of wealth: 2002 KLIPS sample (1,000 won)
Net government
Current asset holdings Human wealth transfer wealth
Age Male Female Male Female Male Female
15–19 101 149 464,594 167,397 –72,443 –42,736
20–24 7,621 2,889 527,751 177,062 –84,009 –41,816
25–29 13,694 22,580 557,049 162,465 –102,658 –38,169
30–34 30,600 32,602 547,875 142,664 –77,243 –28,781
35–39 50,813 57,365 493,474 116,059 –50,528 –22,880
40–44 54,826 57,409 409,820 97,866 –58,873 –25,271
45–49 62,701 69,142 339,778 67,157 –63,491 –17,629
50–54 77,351 62,850 255,087 45,279 –43,449 –3,874
55–59 80,646 70,791 148,242 21,792 –10,388 –713
60–64 75,828 66,876 92,097 12,672 –7,491 –3,370
65–69 78,817 61,860 62,572 5,887 –13,820 –3,626
70–74 92,685 49,102 21,315 1,415 –5,161 –5,499
75–79 47,469 26,347 4,208 278 0 –2,403
80–84 42,306 29,215 1,515 0 0 0
85–89 62,100 18,300 0 0 0 0
90–94 0 7,500 0 0 0 0
95+ 0 0 0 0 0 010.4.2 Projecting Human Wealth and Current Asset Holdings
The magnitude of human wealth and current asset holdings of the future
are computed based on the assumption that the productivity growth rate
and interest rate remain constant (i.e., we adopt a partial equilibrium ap-
proach). The productivity growth rate and interest rate are assumed 1.5 per-
cent and 3.5 percent per annum in real term. The projection begins with
imputation of aggregate value of asset and human capital stock at the bench-
mark year. The aggregate labor income is assumed 60 percent of GDP
based on the record of labor income share for the period 1990 to 2003. We
compute the distribution of wage income by age and sex, by allocating the
aggregate value based on the age-sex proﬁle of wage income estimated by
the Ministry of Labor (2001). Then we use the deﬁnition of human capital
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Table 10.7 Age proﬁle of consumption within family
0–15 16–24 25–39 40–49 50–59 60–64 65–69 70–74 75+
Australia 0.68 0.89 1.00 0.98 1.00 1.05 0.87 0.95 1.19
United States 0.72 0.72 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.27 1.27 1.27
Source: Besanger, Guest, and McDonald (2000).
Table 10.8 Average propensity to consume (2002 KLIPS sample)
Average  Average propensity
Average wealth (A) consumption (B) to consume (A/B)
Age Male Female Male Female Male Female
15–19 392,253 124,810 4,915 4,956 0.013 0.040
20–24 451,363 138,135 4,578 4,937 0.010 0.036
25–29 468,085 146,876 6,101 5,715 0.013 0.039
30–34 501,231 146,486 8,779 7,104 0.018 0.048
35–39 493,759 150,544 10,769 7,245 0.022 0.048
40–44 405,863 130,004 10,628 6,908 0.026 0.053
45–49 338,989 118,670 9,379 6,061 0.028 0.051
50–54 288,988 104,255 9,031 5,699 0.031 0.055
55–59 218,500 91,870 7,960 5,329 0.036 0.058
60–64 160,435 76,178 6,737 6,073 0.042 0.080
65–69 127,569 64,121 6,139 4,912 0.048 0.077
70–74 108,839 45,017 5,062 4,774 0.047 0.106
75–79 51,677 24,222 3,897 4,879 0.076a 0.214a
80–84 43,821 29,215 3,480 5,331 0.076a 0.214a
85–89 62,100 18,300 4,354 6,076 0.076a 0.214a
90–94 0 7,500 0 4,294 0.076a 0.214a
95+ 0 0 0 4,460 0.076a 0.214a
aWe assume that the average propensity to consume is same for the cohorts aged 75 and older.(see equation [2]), to compute the stock value of human capital for the next
several decades.
The aggregate value of asset holdings is assumed to be aggregate capital
income, 40 percent of GDP, divided by the interest rate. We impute the age-
sex distribution of asset holdings in the benchmark year using the asset-
holding proﬁle by age and sex using the 1999 to 2002 KLIPS survey. The
distribution following the benchmark year is computed using equations (6)
and (7).
10.4.3 Projecting Net Government Transfer Wealth
The net government transfer wealth is the present value of the transfer
income from the government minus tax payment to the government for the
remaining lifetime, which is the negative value of generational accounts.
Computing generational accounts is based on the government’s inter-
temporal budget constraint. This constraint, written as equation (10), re-
quires that the future net tax payments of current and future generations
be suﬃcient, in present value, to cover the present value of future govern-
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g
The ﬁrst summation on the left-hand side of equation (10) adds together
the generational accounts of existing generations. The term Nt,t–sstands for
the account of the generation born in year t – s. The index s in this sum-
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Table 10.9 Average propensity to consume (1999–2002 KLIPS sample)
Average 
1999 2000 2001 2002 (1999–2002)
Age Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female
15–19 0.013 0.044 0.012 0.042 0.012 0.041 0.013 0.040 0.012 0.042
20–24 0.011 0.039 0.010 0.040 0.010 0.036 0.010 0.036 0.010 0.038
25–29 0.014 0.041 0.013 0.046 0.013 0.043 0.013 0.039 0.013 0.042
30–34 0.018 0.049 0.018 0.050 0.016 0.045 0.018 0.048 0.017 0.048
35–39 0.024 0.054 0.024 0.057 0.021 0.049 0.022 0.048 0.023 0.052
40–44 0.028 0.048 0.028 0.052 0.027 0.046 0.026 0.053 0.027 0.050
45–49 0.029 0.041 0.030 0.048 0.025 0.045 0.028 0.051 0.028 0.046
50–54 0.032 0.042 0.033 0.047 0.030 0.045 0.031 0.055 0.031 0.047
55–59 0.036 0.056 0.037 0.058 0.030 0.050 0.036 0.058 0.035 0.056
60–64 0.041 0.060 0.043 0.061 0.040 0.058 0.042 0.080 0.041 0.065
65–69 0.048 0.072 0.053 0.074 0.039 0.084 0.048 0.077 0.047 0.077
70–74 0.057 0.088 0.046 0.085 0.033 0.083 0.047 0.106 0.046 0.091
75+ 0.092 0.235 0.137 0.242 0.093 0.207 0.076 0.214 0.099 0.225
(0.05)a (0.123)a
aAdjusted value used in predictions of savings rate.mation runs from age 0 to age D, the maximum length of life. The second
summation on the left-hand side of equation (10) adds together the present
value of remaining net payments of future generations, with s representing
the number of years after year t that each future generation is born. The
ﬁrst term on the right-hand side of equation (10) is the present value of
government consumption. In this summation the values of government
consumption, Gs in year s, are discounted by the pretax real interest rate, r.
The remaining term on the right-hand side, Wt
g, denotes the government’s
net wealth in year t—its assets minus its explicit debt.
Equation (10) indicates the zero sum nature of intergenerational ﬁscal
policy. Holding the present value of government consumption ﬁxed, a re-
duction in the present value of net taxes extracted from current generations
(a decline in the ﬁrst summation on the left size of equation [10]) necessi-
tates an increase in the present value of net tax payment of future genera-
tions.
The term Nt,t in equation (10) is deﬁned by:
(11) Nt,k   ∑
k D
s max(t,k)
T s,kP s,k(1   r) (s t)
In expression (11), T s,kstands for the projected average net tax payments to
the government made in year s by the generation born in year k. The term
P s,kstands for the number of surviving members of the cohort in year swho
were born in year k. For the generations who are born in year k, where k  
t, the summation begins in year k. Regardless of the generation’s year of
birth, the discounting is always back to year t. A set of generational ac-
counts is simply a set of values of Nt,k, one for each existing and future gen-
eration, with the property that the combined present value adds up to the
right-hand side of equation (10).
The traditional Generational Accounts are calculated in two steps. The
ﬁrst step involves calculation of the net tax payments of current genera-
tions (the ﬁrst term on the left-hand side of equation [10]). This is done on
the basis of current ﬁscal rules without being constrained by the intertem-
poral budget constraint of the government. In the second step, given on the
right-hand side of equation (10) and the ﬁrst term on the left-hand side of
equation (10), we determine, as a residual, the value of the second term on
the left-hand side of equation (10), which is the collective payment, mea-
sured as a time-t present value, required of future generations. Accord-
ingly, whereas the ﬁscal burdens for current generations are based entirely
on current ﬁscal rules, the government budget constraint fully determines
the ﬁscal burdens for future generations.
Based on the collective amount required of future generations, we de-
termine the average present value of lifetime net tax payments for each
member of each future generation under the assumption that the average
lifetime tax payments of successive generations rise at the economy’s rate
352 Young Jun Chunof productivity growth. Leaving out this growth adjustment, the lifetime
net tax payments of future generations are directly comparable with those
of current newborns, since the generational accounts of both newborns
and future generations take into account net tax payments over these gen-
erations’ entire lifetimes. Measuring the generational imbalance as the
diﬀerence between two lifetime tax burdens provides a measure for the sus-
tainability of the public ﬁnances. If future generations bear a heavier tax
burden than the newly born do, current ﬁscal rules will have to be adjusted
in the future to meet the budget constraint.
We modify the presentation of generational accounts to make the gen-
erational accounts appropriate for calculation of consumption level of gen-
erations who will survive for the next several decades. We compute the 
generational accounts by age and sex at every year for the next several
decades, because the consumption by age and sex at each year is depend-
ent upon the net government transfer wealth, the negative value of gener-
ational accounts, at the year. The standard approach estimates the ﬁscal
gap between current and future generations, assuming existing policy for
current generations. It is also customary to express this ﬁscal gap using
other measures, such as the required changes in taxes and/or transfer pay-
ments for current and future generations together. Because it is likely that
some of the burden will be placed on current generations and there are di-
ﬀering eﬀects of required changes in taxes and transfer payments across fu-
ture generations, we take this latter approach one step further and actually
present alternative estimates of the accounts for current generations and
future generations, taking such projected increases in their ﬁscal burden
into account, in addition we also renew the generational accounts for
nonzero age groups. For example, we renew the accounts of the cohort
aged a every year, who were a – 1 years old in the previous year, and this
process continues until this cohort reaches the age D, the maximum length
of life. The renewal of the accounts is necessary, because the consumption
of the aged a is dependent upon the renewed accounts. We denote as GA1
the accounts as conventionally presented, and refer to the modiﬁed ac-
counts incorporating the adjustment to restore ﬁscal balance as GA2.13
Table 10.10 reports standard generational accounts (GA1) for Korea,14
under the base case assumptions for the productivity growth rate (1.5 per-
cent) and the real discount rate (3.5 percent).15 The table shows positive
values of net payments for most cohorts alive in our benchmark year 2000
for GA calculation, except for cohorts aged 90 or older, indicating that
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13. A similar presentation method to this one has been used by others in the past, includ-
ing Auerbach and Oreopoulos (2000) and Bovenberg and ter Rele (2000).
14. The data source and calculation procedure is explained in detail in Auerbach and Chun
(2006) and Auerbach, Chun, and Yoo (2005).
15. The accounts are expressed in thousands of won, the domestic currency of Korea. As
of July 2005, 1,025 won were worth about U.S.$1.Table 10.10 Generational accounts (GA1; 1,000 won)
Net Public Medical Employment
Age payment pensions insurance insurance IACI MLSS OSTP
0 56,025 –9,349 –5,100 –684 186 –2,544 –3,344
5 62,689 –8,914 –4,164 –765 220 –2,501 –3,349
10 67,649 –9,174 –3,793 –844 244 –2,431 –3,231
15 67,707 –14,596 –3,687 –933 260 –2,364 –3,162
20 77,218 –11,430 –3,746 –958 261 –2,281 –3,136
25 73,675 –15,271 –4,433 –819 238 –2,183 –3,106
30 64,700 –18,117 –5,248 –706 166 –2,145 –3,056
35 39,226 –35,332 –5,936 –625 143 –2,104 –2,927
40 36,720 –27,882 –6,834 –590 15 –2,098 –2,832
45 32,425 –23,520 –7,514 –512 –9 –2,076 –2,716
50 22,226 –22,910 –8,034 –450 –16 –1,995 –2,593
55 12,788 –21,396 –8,219 –411 95 –1,958 –2,475
60 14,370 –8,371 –7,764 –324 17 –1,894 –2,381
65 8,448 –6,317 –6,864 –245 19 –1,742 –2,287
70 6,407 –3,756 –5,476 –233 –54 –1,468 –1,889
75 5,837 –1,366 –4,185 –181 –43 –979 –1,491
80 2,818 –990 –3,243 –136 –33 –665 –1,144
85 541 –626 –2,376 –98 –25 –340 –864
90 –2,543 –324 –1,635 –67 –18 –260 –612
95 –1,508 –223 –1,022 –42 –11 0 –392
99 –485 –10 –384 –16 –4 0 –149
Future 
generations 122,341 41,676 14,316 1,478 –487
Labor Capital Tax on Asset
income income Consumption asset transactions Other
tax tax tax holding tax taxes Seigniorage
0 7,265 12,769 37,745 3,935 8,745 6,227 172
5 8,174 14,788 38,513 4,404 9,540 6,549 194
10 8,982 16,849 38,963 4,856 10,199 6,813 217
15 9,815 19,160 39,601 5,368 10,889 7,113 244
20 10,624 22,412 40,150 5,952 11,680 7,417 275
25 10,788 23,492 39,102 6,207 11,901 7,495 264
30 9,951 23,057 36,440 6,186 10,837 7,077 258
35 9,535 21,978 33,071 5,939 8,902 6,344 239
40 7,761 20,860 29,603 5,569 7,275 5,638 236
45 6,169 20,016 26,144 5,318 5,925 4,989 211
50 4,033 17,238 22,862 4,689 4,895 4,299 198
55 1,985 15,181 19,278 3,830 3,243 3,459 175
60 588 11,291 15,834 2,957 1,601 2,655 163
65 54 8,582 12,681 2,082 393 1,963 130
70 0 6,323 9,893 1,517 38 1,404 108
75 0 4,101 7,975 908 0 1,023 74
80 0 2,239 5,453 566 0 708 63
85 0 974 3,198 233 0 422 42
90 0 131 52 31 0 125 33
95 0 49 33 3 0 76 19
99 0 28 13 1 0 29 6
Notes: LACI represents Labor’s Accident Compensation Insurance, which is the Korean version of
Worker’s Compensation. MLSS represents Minimum Living Standards Security System, which is a
public aid program to low income classes. OSTP represents the other social transfer programs.most generations will, on balance, pay more in present value than they re-
ceive. One reason for positive burdens even among the elderly is the high
taxes on consumption, capital income, and assets, relative to taxes on la-
bor income.16 The age proﬁle of the average tax burden on capital is more
skewed to older age groups than that of labor income taxes, and the con-
sumption tax burden for older age groups is quite high.
The more important reason that even older generations have positive 
net payments is that social welfare beneﬁts such as public pension bene-
ﬁts, medical insurance (MI) beneﬁts, minimum living standards security
(MLSS) beneﬁts, and other social welfare services (OSTP) were quite small
in the aggregate as of 2000. Aggregate public pension and MI beneﬁts were
1.1 percent and 1.7 percent of GDP respectively as of 2000, and those for
the MLSS and the OSTP were 0.5 percent and 0.6 percent of GDP, re-
spectively. However, maturation of the public pension system and the pro-
jected increase in social welfare expenditures will increase transfer pay-
ments to old-age groups. This maturation is shown in ﬁgure 10.4, which
displays the relative (to age-40 males) beneﬁt proﬁle in 2000 along with the
corresponding proﬁles projected at other dates through 2080. As a result,
the accounts for a wider range of old-age groups will turn negative in the
future, given current policy.
The row labeled “Future Generation” in table 10.10 indicates the pres-
ent value of amounts that those born in 2001 will, on average, pay, assum-
ing that subsequent generations pay this same amount except for the ad-
justment for growth. The account for future generations is about 118
percent larger than those for those aged 0, which implies that the current
ﬁscal policies are not sustainable and that a substantial ﬁscal burden is
shifted to future generations.
Table 10.10 also reports the present value, rest-of-life transfer beneﬁts
and tax burdens by category. The substantial negative entries for public
pensions and medical insurance play a key role in the large overall genera-
tional imbalance. On the tax side, three important characteristics of the
Korean tax system are: (a) the large share of consumption taxes; (b) the rel-
ative unimportance of labor income taxes; and (c) the large proportion ac-
counted for by taxes on asset transactions. The largest present value (for
ages 0 and age 30) is the consumption tax, followed by the capital income
tax, the tax on asset transactions, labor income tax, other taxes, and taxes
on asset holdings. The present value of the tax burden on older age groups,
relative to that on younger age groups, is heaviest for consumption taxes,
followed by capital income taxes, taxes on asset holdings, taxes on asset
transactions, and labor income taxes.
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16. Revenues from consumption tax, capital income tax, taxes on asset holding, and labor
income tax in South Korea as of 2000 were 9.1 percent, 5.1 percent, 1.3 percent, and 2.2 per-
cent of GDP, respectively.Figure 10.5 reports the GA2,17 omitting the accounts for the nonzero
aged in the future, under alternative scenarios to attainment long-term ﬁs-
cal balance of government budget: (a) no change in ﬁscal policies; (b) in-
creasing tax burden of the cohorts alive in 2010 and thereafter by 23.1 per-
cent of tax burden under current policies; and (c) maintaining budget
balance every year (pay-as-you-go scheme). The case (a) is a hypothetical
situation in which the government does not intend to attain long-term bud-
getary balance, thus, this should be treated as a benchmark case to evalu-
ate the eﬀects of policy changes to attain long-term budgetary balance. The
case (b) is a scheme of prefunding, since under this scheme the government
(primary) budget balance maintains surplus until around 2025 and there-
after the budget turns deﬁcit. Comparison of case (a) with case (b) or case
(c) shows that the current ﬁscal policies are not sustainable and to main-
tain the current policies related with government consumption and trans-
fer payments the net tax burden for future generations as well as current
generations should be substantially raised. The proﬁle of ﬁscal burden
across generations is crucially dependent upon the method to attain the
long-term budgetary balance. The pay-as-you-go scheme (case [c]) further
shifts the ﬁscal burden to the future generations than the prefunding
scheme (case [b]).
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Fig. 10.4 Public pension beneﬁt proﬁle
17. The index for the generations speciﬁed in the x-axis is according to the year of birth of
each cohort, with the 2000 newborns being generation 0. The generations indexed below zero
are current generations and those indexed higher than 0 are future generations. The accounts
for the future generations are evaluated at the productivity value as of 2000 to make the ac-
counts for future generations comparable with those of current generations.10.5 Findings
10.5.1 Projected Savings Rates, 2002–2090
We predict the savings rates for the period 2002 to 2090, based on the
life-cycle framework described in section 10.3, and using the imputed value
of current asset holdings, the projected value of human wealth, net gov-
ernment transfer wealth explained in section 10.4. Before our prediction,
we adjust the average propensity to consume to reproduce the level of ag-
gregate consumption in our benchmark year 2002. We adjust the average
propensity in two steps. First, we reduce the propensity to consume for the
aged 75 and older by 50 percent, since their estimated value is extremely
high, more than 200 percent of the value for the aged 70 to 74. It is also due
to the fact that the number of observations of the aged 75 and older is very
small, thus, the estimated value of the average propensity to consume is not
reliable. The predicted value of aggregate consumption in our benchmark
year, using the adjusted propensity to consume, is 413 trillion won, 6.2 per-
cent higher than its actual value. Therefore, we reduce the overall level of
the average propensity to consume by 6.2 percent, maintaining its proﬁle
by age and sex.
Tables 10.11 to 10.14 summarize the prediction results. Table 10.11
shows the predicted value, evaluated at the ﬁxed price as of 2002, of the
wealth and annual values related with the wealth and government budget
balance. The noncapital income grows faster than the productivity growth
rate (1.5 percent per annum) until the late 2010s despite the population ag-
ing, since the total population will increase until it reaches a peak around
2025. The growth rate of noncapital income falls rapidly, which induces the
decrease in growth rate of human wealth, which is deﬁned as the present
value of noncapital income earned for the remaining lifetime. The growth
rate of the human wealth is lower than that of noncapital income, because
the former reﬂects the decrease in the growth rate of the latter in the future.
The human wealth has the largest proportion of total wealth.
The transfer wealth, which is deﬁned as the present value of the net
transfer income from the government for the remaining lifetime, is negative
for the next several decades under the current policies. However, its value
becomes positive around 2055, which reﬂects the fact that the government
transfer payments will increase much faster than the tax revenue due to the
population aging, maturing of public pensions, and increasing demand for
social welfare expenditure. Table 10.10, which summarizes generational
accounts for Korea (GA1), shows that the accounts for most of the current
generations are positive, reﬂecting the fact that the current level of govern-
ment transfer payment is low due to the short history of public pensions
and low level of social welfare expenditure at present. Despite the positive
accounts for most of the current generations, the generational imbalance


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.of the net payment is very high (118 percent), since the forward-looking
property of the generational accounting reﬂects the rapid increase in gov-
ernment transfer payments in the future due to maturing of public pen-
sions, and prospective increase in social welfare expenditure resulting from
population aging and increasing demand for social welfare expenditure.18
The negative accounts of public pensions and medical insurance and social
welfare expenditure (MLSS, OSTP) explains a substantial part of the gen-
erational imbalance. While the growth rate of tax revenue is lower than that
of government transfer payment because of the reduction in the economi-
cally active population due to population aging, the government consump-
tion grows faster than tax revenues, which further deteriorates the govern-
ment budget balance.
The growth rate of aggregate consumption is higher than the GDP
growth rate, due to the population aging and increasing age proﬁle of the
average propensity to consume, which raises the ratio of private consump-
tion to GDP.19 The increasing ratio of consumption to GDP results in de-
crease in the value of asset holdings. The absolute level of the asset hold-
ings falls after the early 2010s, which decreases capital income and the
GDP growth rate.20
Tables 10.13 and 10.14 show the predicted savings rates under the alter-
native assumptions about the ﬁscal policies and fertility rates. We simulate
3 cases: (a) a hypothetical situation in which current ﬁscal policies are
maintains disregarding the long-term budget imbalance; (b) an economy
in which the government proportionally adjusts the tax burden of cohorts
alive in 2010 and thereafter to match the present value of tax revenue of 
the present and the future to that of government transfer payment and gov-
ernment consumption (prefunding); and (c) an economy in which the gov-
ernment maintains the budget balance every year (balanced budget or pay-
as-you-go scheme).
The private savings, and government savings, deﬁned as the government
primary budget surplus, depend crucially upon the method to restore the
long-term budgetary balance. Compared with case (a), the national sav-
ings rates, the sum of private and government savings rates, in the case of
prefunding is higher, since higher level of transfer wealth in case (a) induces
higher level of consumption and the government budget in case (a) is more
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18. Auerbach and Chun (2006) projected that aggregate public pension beneﬁts will in-
crease from 1.1 percent of GDP as of 2000 to 16 percent in 2080. Beneﬁts of medical insur-
ance and public aid programs are projected to increase from 1.7 percent and 1.1 percent of
GDP, respectively, to 5.1 percent and 2.1 percent during the same period. The projected level
of the medical insurance beneﬁts and public aid to low-income families is based on very con-
servative income elasticity (1.2). Therefore, the projected levels should be interpreted as their
minimum level under current policies.
19. The ratio rises from 56.8 percent as of 2002 to 72.5 percent in 2050.
20. The eﬀects on the asset holdings might be exaggerated, since our approach is a partial
equilibrium approach. Under a general equilibrium approach the eﬀects will be mitigated,
since the increase in the rate of return to capital will be a buﬀer to mitigate the reduction in
asset holdings.imbalanced, which implies that delay in the policy revisions to restore the
long-term government budgetary balance will induce lower savings rates.
Comparison of case (b) and case (c) shows the eﬀects of intergenerational
redistribution of net tax burden. Figure 10.5shows that transition from the
prefunding scheme to the balanced budget scheme redistributes the ﬁscal
burden, deﬁned as net payment to the government, from current genera-
tions to future generations. This redistribution of resource from the future
generations to the current generations raises the savings rates of current
generations. Therefore, the private savings rates of the near future are
higher incase (c).21However, the private savings rates after 2050 are higher
in case (b), because under the prefunding scheme, the resource for the fu-
ture generations is much larger than that under the pay-as-you-go scheme.
The government savings rate of the period after 2020 is lower in case (b),
since case (b) allows the budget deﬁcit in the far-away future while the pre-
funding accumulates the budget surplus in the government fund in prepa-
ration for the budget deﬁcit in the future.
Even though there are some variations in the projected savings rate de-
pending on the method to restore the long-term budgetary balance, the
overall results imply that the drastic decrease in the savings rate will be in-
evitable because of the population aging and its magnitude will be sub-
stantial. In particular, the decrease in the government savings rate result-
ing from the increase in government’s transfer payments and government
consumption contributes substantially to the decrease in national savings
rate and the absolute magnitude of the fall in government savings rate is
much larger than that in private savings rate.
We try a sensitivity analysis on the fertility rates. Changing the fertility
rates substantially aﬀects the savings rate in the long run. However, the
national savings rates of the next several decades are not aﬀected much, be-
cause we assume gradual change in fertility rates (see table 10.3). It is also
because it takes time for the change in the fertility rates, which changes the
number of newborns, to aﬀect the age structure of the population, which
aﬀects the aggregate value of consumption and savings.
It is remarkable that in the transition period, increase (decrease) in fer-
tility rate decreases (increases) the private and government savings rate,
even though the magnitude of the decrease (increase) is not very large.
Figure 10.6 shows that even though the increase in fertility rates increases
private savings (pri sav), the speed of increase in private savings is lower
than that of GDP for a considerable time, because the increase in the pro-
portion of young population reduces the net transfer payments (gov net trf),
which makes the speed of increase in disposable income in aggregate lower
than that of GDP. Figure 10.6 also shows that the speed of increase in gov-
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21. The redistribution of resources to the current generations increases the consumption
level of current generations. However, the private savings rates also rise since the marginal
(also average) propensity to consume is lower than 1.ernment consumption (gov con) is higher than that of GDP in the transi-
tion period. It is due to the fact that the increase in the young population
dependency ratio resulting from the increase in fertility rate increases the
government consumption for the young population, such as educational
expenditure, for the transition period, while the rise in the fertility rate will
reduce the speed of government consumption increase eventually because
it will reduce the proportion of old-age population, which will reduce the
old-age-population-speciﬁc government consumption.
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Fig. 10.5 Generational accounts (GA2; 1 million won)
Fig. 10.6 Ratio of variables under high fertility to those under medium fertility
(under current policy)10.5.2 Further Consideration
Eﬀects of Altruism
The life-cycle framework used for the prediction in this chapter pre-
cludes the possibility of consumption smoothing among generations through
intergenerational redistribution. We investigate its eﬀects, based on an al-
truistic family model, in which the family planner maximizes the expected
utility over consumption of each surviving member at diﬀerent dates (see
equation 12) subject to household budget constraint (see equation 13):












where  a is the weight in the family utility function given to an age a indi-
vidual, P at is the surviving population of age a in year t,   is a pure rate of
time preference, and R0 is full family resources, which is composed of cur-
rent asset holdings, human wealth, and net government transfer wealth.
The solution of the maximization problem has the distinctive property
that the cross-section age-consumption proﬁle is constant over time, and
that consumption at each age grows over time at a rate determined by the
after-tax interest rate and the rate of time preference:
(14)   h 1      , h    
(15)   h 1  
where r n is the after-tax interest rate, and h is the marginal rate of substitu-
tion function of homothetic utility.
We solve the equations (13) through (15) for the consumption level over
time for each generation, using the estimated age-consumption proﬁle (see
table 10.8), under the assumption that the growth rate of consumption ( )
for each age group is the same as the wage growth rate.22
Figure 10.7 reports the predicted savings rates over time under the situ-
ation in which the current ﬁscal policies are maintained. The altruistic 
family model produces similar predictions to those based on the life-cycle
model. The national savings rate declines to 4 percent around 2065, and the
government savings rate turns to negative value. The diﬀerence in the pre-










1   
 
1   rn
Cjt 1  
Cjt
P atCat  
(1   r)t
Population Aging, Fiscal Policies, and National Saving 365
22. We assume that the nominal interest rate is 5 percent. We adjust the interest rate to this
value in order to prevent the labor income share from diverging from the range of 60 to 73
percent.dicted savings rates between the two frameworks is in the trend of private
savings rate. The consumption smoothing across generations due to the al-
truism between generations produces diﬀerent trends of private savings
rate from that under the life-cycle framework: the private savings rate pre-
dicted under the altruistic family model is lower in the transition period
when the population rapidly ages than that under the life-cycle model, while
the private savings rate in the long-run is higher under the former.
Eﬀects of Annuitization of Wealth
The prediction of the savings rate under the life-cycle framework, de-
scribed in sections 10.3 and 10.4, is based on the assumption that the
propensity to consume does not change over time and is the same regard-
less of the kind of wealth. However, the previous researches, such as Auer-
bach and Kotlikoﬀ (1992) and Kotlikoﬀ, Gokhale, and Sabelhaus (1996),
suggested the possibility of rise in the propensity to consume resulting
from the annuitization of wealth. The investigation of the eﬀect of the an-
nuitization of wealth in the Korean context is very suggestive, since the
proportion of the current asset holdings including housing and real estate
is projected to decrease (see table 10.11). In addition, the increase in the
old-age population and maturing of public pensions and introduction of
reverse annuity mortgages imply that the household wealth will be sub-
stantially annuitized.
In order to investigate the eﬀects of the annuitization of household
wealth, we estimate the consumption functions at the individual level,
which include current asset holdings, human wealth, and net pension
wealth as explanatory variables. For the estimation, we use 1999 to 2002
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Fig. 10.7 Projected savings rate (altruistic family model)KLIPS sample, which is used to estimate the average propensity to con-
sume (see section 10.4.1). For the estimation of consumption functions, we
include the individuals who belong to the age group 15 to 64 and who have
positive noncapital income. We use log values of consumption and those of
explanatory variables as well as their absolute levels for the estimation. We
include the age and the age squared as explanatory variables to control the
diﬀering preferences across age groups.
Table 10.15 shows mixed implication of the annuitization of wealth.
When we use the 1999 to 2002 samples separately or the pooled sample, the
elasticity of consumption with respect to the net pension wealth is smaller
than that with respect to the current asset holdings.23 Moreover, the coeﬃ-
cient for the current asset holdings in the estimation using the level vari-
ables is larger than that for the net pension wealth in most cases, which im-
plies that the marginal propensity to consume with respect to the former is
larger than that with respect to the latter. This suggests that the annuitiza-
tion of wealth will not lower the savings rate. However, using ﬁxed-eﬀect
panel equations produces larger elasticity of consumption and marginal
propensity to consume with respect to the net pension wealth than those
with respect to the current asset holdings. Considering the fact that the
ﬁxed-eﬀect panel equation approach reﬂects the characteristics of the in-
dividuals in the sample better than the pooled sample approach or the es-
timation using a single-year sample, the result suggests that the annuitiza-
tion of wealth in the future in Korea, due to the population aging, maturing
of public pensions, and introduction of reverse annuity mortgages, will fur-
ther reduce the savings rate in the future.
We also estimate the consumption function at the household level, since
the individual’s consumption used as the dependent variable in the estima-
tion of consumption function at the individual level is constructed by al-
locating the household consumption based on Australia’s age proﬁle of
consumption (see table 10.7). We use household consumption (and its log
value), which is reported in KLIPS, as the dependent variable, and include
the number of household members, primary income earner’s age, the age
squared, and each household’s total values of current asset holdings, hu-
man wealth, and net pension wealth, as explanatory variables. Table 10.16
shows that change of analysis unit from the individual level to the house-
hold level does not change the structure of consumption functions esti-
mated using the ﬁxed-eﬀect models and moreover it reinforces our predic-
tion that the annuitization of wealth is likely to further lower the savings
rate, because the marginal propensity to consume with respect to the net
pension wealth estimated using single-year samples or the pooled sample
is larger than that with respect to the current asset holdings in most cases.
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23. This result may be partly due to the measurement error incurred in computing the value
of the net pension wealth.It is remarkable that maturing of the NPS is likely to further increase
consumption levels. Table 10.16 shows the coeﬃcient for the product of
dummy variables, for the NPS participation as opposed to the OCP, and
the value of net pension wealth, is negative and signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
0 in most of cases,24 which implies that the elasticity of consumption with
respect to net pension wealth is smaller for the NPS participants than that
for the OCP participants. It is probably due to the fact that the history of
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Table 10.15 Individual consumption functions
1999 2000 2001 2002 Pooled Fixed
sample sample sample sample sample effect
Dependent variable: consumption
Constant –652.3 –623.7 –543.7 –726.6 –562.2 –641.4
(54.4) (61.4) (69.8) (80.1) (34.62) (77.1)
Age 42.48 42.93 50.23 53.17 44.04 46.316
(2.80) (3.12) (3.55) (4.036) (7.762) (3.910)
Age2 –0.442 –0.443 –0.571 –0.552 –0.470 –0.458
(0.034) (0.037) (0.042) (0.047) (0.021) (0.046)
Asset holdings (x1) 0.011 0.012 0.017 0.018 0.016 0.011
(0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0004) (0.007)
<0.071>< 0.069>< 0.101>< 0.102>< 0.095>< 0.065>
Human wealth (x2) 0.006 0.006 0.002 0.005 0.004 0.003
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.0009) (0.0001)
<0.364>< 0.344>< 0.120>< 0.267>< 0.23>< 0.17>
Net pension  0.012 0.012 0.013 0.013 0.016 0.029
wealth (x3) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.0019)
<0.053>< 0.055>< 0.062>< 0.057>< 0.073>< 0.132>
Dependent variable: log(consumption)
Constant –5.641 –5.365 –4.937 –5.214 –6.146 –7.354
(0.442) (0.422) (0.360) (0.322) (0.188) (0.358)
Age 0.090 0.075 0.080 0.064 0.071 0.063
(0.0048) (0.0049) (0.0046) (0.0043) (0.002) (0.0052)
Age2 –0.0008 –0.0007 –0.0007 –0.0005 –0.0006 –0.0004
(0.00006) (0.0006) (0.00005) (0.0005) (0.00002) (0.00006)
log(x1)a 0.224 0.312 0.2310 0.327 0.268 0.1601
(0.021) (0.025) (0.017) (0.019) (0.010) (0.016)
log(x2)a 0.596 0.529 0.548 0.533 0.577 0.524
(0.020) (0.021) (0.017) (0.016) (0.009) (0.014)
log(x3)a 0.148 0.150 0.151 0.153 0.231 0.540
(0.049) (0.045) (0.038) (0.034) (0.020) (0.0404)
Notes:Numbers in parentheses represent standard errors. Numbers in angle brackets represent the elas-
ticity evaluated at the mean of the explanatory variable.
aWe use log(–min(x1) + 1 + xi) (i = 1, 2, 3) to avoid negative value for the argument of log function.
24. The coeﬃcient is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 0 at 5 percent signiﬁcance level in the case
of pooled sample II level and log equation. The P-value of the coeﬃcient is 5.4 percent in the
ﬁxed-eﬀect panel estimation (ﬁxed-eﬀect II) using log variables. In the case of the ﬁxed-eﬀect




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Ithe NPS is very short and most of the NPS participants have not acquired
the entitlement to pension beneﬁts. Therefore, it is highly likely that the
maturing of the NPS will raise the elasticity of consumption with respect
to the net NPS wealth at least to the level with respect to the net OCP
wealth in the future, which will further reduce the savings rate.
10.6 Conclusion
This chapter has investigated the eﬀects of population aging and ﬁscal
policies on the national savings rate of the future. For the prediction of the
national savings rate of Korea for the next several decades, we employed 
a life-cycle model, which incorporated the generational accounting ap-
proach needed to assess the distribution of ﬁscal burden across genera-
tions, and we tried a sensitivity analysis by using an altruistic family model
to investigate the eﬀects of altruism among generations on the savings
rates. We also studied the eﬀects of change in asset composition, such as
annuitization of assets resulting from maturing of public pensions and in-
troduction of reverse annuity mortgages by estimating consumption func-
tions, which enables comparison of elasticity of consumption with respect
to the magnitude of various kinds of wealth. We found that the rapid pop-
ulation aging and long-term budgetary imbalance will substantially lower
the national savings rate in Korea, and that the existence of the altruism
among generations does not produce qualitatively diﬀerent results. In ad-
dition, the estimation results of consumption functions with respect to var-
ious kinds of wealth suggest that the annuitization of wealth due to ma-
turing of public pensions and introduction of reverse annuity mortgage is
likely to further decrease the savings rate in the future.
In addition to the population aging and the generational imbalance of
ﬁscal burden, premature reuniﬁcation of South and North Korea will be a
large burden of South Korean taxpayers. Auerbach, Chun, and Yoo (2005)
showed that to ﬁnance the reuniﬁcation cost, the tax burden of cohorts
alive in 2010 and thereafter should be raised by about 30 percent of tax bur-
den under current ﬁscal policies, which will further reduce national savings
of the future. In order to restore the sustainability of ﬁscal policies as well
as to prevent a drastic decrease in the savings rate, fundamental reforms of
ﬁscal policies, such as public pension reform, medical insurance reform,
and restructuring of government consumption policies, are necessary.
For the analysis in this chapter, we adopted a life-cycle framework, under
which we implicitly assumed that the propensity to consume is the same
across various kinds of wealth. However, the estimated consumption func-
tions suggest that change in the composition of wealth will induce drifts of
the propensity to consume. Construction of the model, which enables the
analysis of the eﬀects of asset composition changes, such as the annuitiza-
tion of wealth, will be an important agenda for our future research.
Population Aging, Fiscal Policies, and National Saving 371Our projection suggests a drastic decrease in asset holdings due to pop-
ulation aging and ﬁscal policies. The prediction may exaggerate the de-
creasing trend of asset holdings and savings rate, since our approach is a
partial equilibrium approach. A general equilibrium approach needs to be
considered for the future research, because the general equilibrium change
in factor prices (i.e., rise in rate of return to capital) resulting from decrease
in capital stock, mitigates the drastic downward trend of asset holdings.
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Comment Laurence J. Kotlikoﬀ
This chapter by Young Jun Chun is a very impressive study. It shows that
one can readily apply the life-cycle theory of saving to make aggregate sav-
ing forecasts for countries, to understand the saving impacts of alternative
ﬁscal policy changes, and to consider the saving eﬀects of factors such as
the degree of annuitization and the extent of altruism. The paper projects
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